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A comprehensive analysis of strategic information warfare waged via digital means as a distinct concern for the United States and its allies. In the "information age," information systems may serve as both weapons and targets. Although the media has paid a good deal of attention to information warfare, most treatments so far are overly broad and without analytical foundations. In this book Gregory Rattray offers a comprehensive analysis of strategic information warfare waged via digital means as a distinct concern for the United States and its allies. Rattray begins by analyzing salient features of information infrastructures and distinguishing strategic information warfare from other types of information-based competition, such as financial crime and economic espionage. He then establishes a conceptual framework for the successful conduct of strategic warfare in general, and of strategic information warfare in particular. Taking a historical perspective, he examines U.S. efforts to develop air bombardment capabilities in the period between World Wars I and II and compares them to U.S. efforts in the 1990s to develop the capability to conduct strategic information warfare. He concludes with recommendations for strengthening U.S. strategic information warfare defenses.

Contrary to popular misconceptions and public branding as "dirty tricks," covert action and counterintelligence can have considerable value. Democracies, while wary of these instruments, have benefited significantly from their use, saving lives, treasure, and gaining strategic advantage. As liberal democracies confront the post-Cold War mix of rogue states and non-state actors, such as criminals and terrorists, and weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, these clandestine arts may prove to be important tools of statecraft, and perhaps trump cards in the twenty-first century. Godson defines covert action as influencing events in other parts of the world without attribution, and counterintelligence as identifying, neutralizing, and exploiting the secret activities of others. Together they provide the capability to resist manipulation and control others to advantage. Counterintelligence protects U.S. military, technological, and diplomatic secrets and turns adversary intelligence to U.S. advantage. Covert action enables the United States to weaken adversaries and to assist allies who may be hampered by open acknowledgment of foreign support. Drawing on contemporary and historical literature, broad-ranging contacts with senior intelligence officials in many countries, as well as his own research and experience as a longtime consultant to the U.S. government, Godson traces the history of U.S. covert action and counterintelligence since 1945, showing that covert action works well when it is part of a well-coordinated policy and when policy makers are committed to succeeding in the long-term. Godson argues that the best counterintelligence is an offensive defense. His exposition of the essential theoretical foundations of both covert action and counterintelligence, supported by historical examples, lays out the ideal conditions for their use, as well as demonstrating why they are so difficult to attain. This book will be of interest to students and general readers interested in political science, national security, foreign policy, and military policy.

Washington's failure to foresee the collapse of its superpower rival ranks high in the pantheon of predictive failures. The question of who got it right or wrong has been intertwined with the deeper issue of who won the Cold War. Like the disputes over who lost China and Iran, this debate has been fought out along ideological and partisan lines, with conservatives claiming credit for the Evil Empire's demise and liberals arguing that the causes were internal to the Soviet Union. The intelligence community has come in for harsh criticism for overestimating Soviet strength and overlooking the symptoms of crisis; the discipline of Sovietology has dissolved into acrimonious irrelevance. Drawing on declassified documents, interviews, and careful analysis of contemporary literature, this book offers the first systematic analysis of this predictive failure at the paradigmatic, foreign policy, and intelligence levels. Although it is focused on the Soviet case, it offers lessons that are both timely and necessary.

An updated revision of the first comprehensive overview of intelligence designed for both the student and the general reader, *Silent Warfare* is an insider's guide to a shadowy, often misunderstood world. Leading intelligence scholars Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt clearly explain such topics as the principles of collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action, and their interrelationship with policymakers and democratic values. *Military Intelligence History Reading List 2012.*

"The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea." Mao Tse-Tung claimed in *On Guerilla Warfare* that the guerrilla move seamlessly amongst the people. If the guerrilla are the fish and the people the sea, then police intelligence are the blue fish which live and hunt in that sea alongside them. All modern counterinsurgency theories rely on separating the people from the insurgent. But Randall Wilson's *Blue Fish In A Dark Sea* contends that the use of police intelligence will allow for a different approach; of separating the insurgent head from the insurgent body so that the body is seen by people as an infection, ridding it of a protective camouflage. The existence of police intelligence and its unique, but all too often marginalised capacity for uncovering and destroying the prime movers of an insurgency must be re-examined. It is by no means a panacea for civil strife but, as an integral component of a combined counterinsurgency strategy, it provides a weapon which is more feared by insurgents than any other. Knowing who they are and where they're hiding renders the insurgent visible and touchable. In *Blue Fish In A Dark Sea: Police Intelligence in a Counterinsurgency*, Wilson explores and discusses the various elements of police intelligence ubiquitous to the trade, and presents the most efficacious means of employing this skill set in the environment of a counterinsurgency. *Constructing Cassandra* analyzes the intelligence failures at the CIA that resulted in four key strategic surprises experienced by the US: the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Iranian revolution of 1978, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks—surprises still play out today in U.S. policy. Although there has been no shortage of studies exploring how intelligence failures can happen, none of them have been able to provide a unified understanding of the phenomenon. To correct that omission, this book brings culture and identity to the foreground to present a unified model of strategic surprise; one that focuses on the internal make-up the CIA, and takes seriously those Cassandras who offered warnings, but were ignored. This systematic exploration of the sources of the CIA's intelligence failures points to ways to prevent future strategic surprises.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 marked a turning point in international politics, representing a new type of

